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ABSTRACT 
 
The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) has legislated and aims to be net zero emissions by 2045. 
Therefore, we need to understand now the impacts on the gas distribution network of the transition to 
100% hydrogen. 
To assess the viability of decarbonising ACT gas networks based on the cost of reusing the ACT gas 
network for the safe and reliable distribution of hydrogen requires each element of the natural gas safety 
management system to be evaluated and where gaps in capability are identified, appropriate measures 
taken to ensure ongoing validity of the safety case. 
Evoenergy (the ACT’s gas distribution company) have constructed a Test Facility, incorporating an 
electrolyser, a gas supply pressure reduction and mixing skid a replica gas network and a domestic 
installation with gas appliances.  Jointly with Australian National University (ANU) and Canberra 
Institute of Technology (CIT) the Company has commenced a program of “bench testing”, initially with 
100% hydrogen to identify gaps in the safety case specifically focusing on the materials, work practices 
and safety systems in the ACT. 
 
The facility is designed to assess: 
• Materials in use including aged network materials and components 
• Construction and installation techniques both greenfield and live gas work 
• Purging and filling techniques 
• Leak detection both underground and above ground 
• Emergency response and make safe techniques 
• Issues associated with use of hydrogen in light commercial and domestic appliances. 
 
To educate and train: 
• Technicians and gas fitters on infrastructure installation and management 
• Emergency response services on responding to hydrogen related emergencies in a network 
environment; and 
• manage public perceptions of hydrogen in a network environment. 
Australia has an enviable safety record for the safe and reliable transport, distribution and use of natural 
gas. The ACT natural gas network owned and operated by Evoenergy is one of the newest in Australia 
and has leveraged off the best materials and practices in Australia to build its network.   
The paper addresses major safety issues relating to the production/storage, distribution and consumer 
end use of hydrogen injected into existing gas distribution networks.   The analysis is guided by the 
Safety Management System. The Hydrogen Testing Facility described in the paper provide tools for 
evaluation of hydrogen safety matters in the ACT and Australia-wide. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Decarbonising the gas network in the Australian Capital Territory will be necessary to meet ambitious 
greenhouse gas emission reduction targets set by the ACT Legislative Assembly (for zero net zero 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2045). The principal target (the ACT target) is to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in the ACT to achieve zero net emissions by 30 June 2045. The interim target is to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in the ACT to 40% less than 1990 emissions by 30 June 2020 [1]. 
Decarbonising the gas network will also help to retain value in the existing infrastructure and provide 
electrical energy storage and supply demand, alignment capability. Evoenergy intend to decarbonise its   
network utilising hydrogen and most likely a small portion of biomethane from organic waste. The major 
proportion 90% + being hydrogen requires evaluation of existing infrastructure, work practices, 
consumer, and public and emergency service’s needs. 
 
1.1 Safety Management System 
   
The enviable safety record of Australia including the ACT has for the production, transmission, 
distribution and use of natural gas can be largely attributed to sound safety management frameworks 
and systems and processes developed over many years. The core of these frameworks is established by 
the Australian Standards and required by Acts and regulations around Australia. These Standards are 
developed collaboratively with key industry bodies, regulators, operators, consultants and suppliers. 
Gas Safety Act Victoria (1997) is a relevant example. The Act sets out a “general duty on gas companies 
to manage and operate facilities to minimise, as far as practicable: the hazards and risks to public safety 
caused by interruptions to gas supply, including reinstatement of supply, and damage to property of the 
public caused by gas”.  
A key tool applied by the Gas Safety Act 1997 (Vic) is the requirement on gas companies to prepare 
safety cases, which are plans that explain how they intend to meet their general duties to minimise 
hazards to public safety under the Gas Safety Act. The nature of requirements to be included within in a 
safety case document are set out in the Gas Safety (Safety Case) Regulations 2018 (Vic) (updated from 
the previous 2008 regulations). Energy Safety Victoria argues that the new Regulations strike a balance 
between prescription and flexibility in the management of safety risks in the gas industry. The Gas 
Safety (Safety Case) Regulations 2018 (Vic) prescribe Australian Standards 4564-2011 as the standard 
of quality for natural gas and thus adopts national industry codes [2]. 
As in Victoria other States and Territories in Australia require a “Safety Case” or equivalent regime 
called a Safety and Operating Plan or a Safety Management Plan. These plans require the operator to 
assess risk in advance and take appropriate risk mitigation actions or follow a prescribed set of 
requirements. These plans are extensive and deal with all areas impacted by the infrastructure, operations 
of the infrastructure and include normal operations, abnormal operations and emergency response. 
This is designed to ensure that operators, consumers and the public are not unduly impacted by the 
existence and operation of gas infrastructure and that operations remains both safe and reliable over the 
life of the asset. 
One unresolved issue is whether hydrogen is considered a prescribed ‘contaminant’ under AS4564 if it 
is considered that it falls within “other substances, to the extent that they cause damage to, or problems 
in the operation of pipelines or appliances…” (s.2.2(c)) 
Where no new law has been introduced to address hydrogen safety it is relevant to turn to international 
standards, and domestic standards, gas safety law and to civil liability law (i.e. tort law).  
Existing regulatory frameworks such as dangerous goods legislation and gas safety laws already 
indirectly address the use of hydrogen. In addition to legislation, the common law of negligence and 
product liability is relevant to new applications of hydrogen, and the risk of litigation over failure to 
address reasonably foreseeable risks will be reflected in practical issues relating to insurance of 
companies undertaking hydrogen projects. In order to maintain insurance coverage, gas companies will 
need to show the exercise of due diligence by preparation of risk management plans and safety cases for 
hydrogen related activities, whether or not these are required by current legislation [3,4].  
There are many existing Australian standards that are relevant to the transportation, storage and use of 
hydrogen. For example, Standards Australia AS/NZS 4645.1:2018 Gas distribution networks: Network 
management, which specifies the requirements for safe, reliable and sustainable management of gas 
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distribution networks operating at less than or equal to 1050 kPa that reticulate gas to consumers. In 
addition, Standards Australia AS/NZS 4645.3:2018 Gas distribution networks Plastics pipe systems is 
relevant.  
In addition, there are numerous international hydrogen safety and production standards.  
Australia must decide whether to adopt or modify these international standards.  
The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) has standards pertaining to hydrogen gas 
generators using water electrolysis [5]. These standards define the construction, safety and performance 
requirements of industrial, commercial and residential appliances using electrolysis. Standards Australia 
has not yet published a standard on hydrogen production. A search of the Standards Australia database 
in the Electrotechnology and Energy Sector suggests that hydrogen standards have not yet been made 
in Australia [6]. In this sense, Australia is lagging behind other developed countries. The British,[7] 
French [8], Spanish [9], Danish [10], and Netherlands [11] Standards Associations have all adopted at 
least one of the ISO standards on hydrogen generation. 
A fundamental choice for Australian law makers is whether there should be a stand-alone National 
Hydrogen Act passed by the Federal Parliament and whether new provisions should be inserted into the 
National Gas Act and National Gas Rules (noting that these apply through mirror legislation in the 
majority of the States). Because gas, particularly gas safety, is also regulated on a State and Territory 
basis it will also be necessary to encourage regulatory reform at the sub-national level.   
These safety management systems required under Federal and State legislation and Standards have been 
established and modified over a number of years. Changes in technology and incidents such as those at 
Longford, Varanus Island and San Bruno, initiate changes to relevant parts of these safety management 
systems.[12] 
This paper covers the aspects of the Safety Management System at an operations level that Evoenergy 
is examining at their hydrogen test site, to determine the viability of introducing 100% hydrogen into 
the ACT gas network whilst maintaining the high levels of safety and reliability currently expected by 
ACT consumers and the community. 
 
1.2  Test Site Objectives 
 
Safety management systems cover the full extent of natural gas energy provision from production, 
transmission, distribution to end use by the consumer and the end to end lifecycle from design, 
construction and commissioning through to operations, maintenance and decommissioning. The Test 
Facility will support the development and modification of Safety Management Systems for hydrogen 
distribution networks, 
The Evoenergy Test Facility was established to examine safe and reliable management of hydrogen in 
production, distribution and use. Large scale production is not a priority for the Test Facility rather 
evaluating the benefits of production in cross coupling the electricity and gas networks to integrate 
renewables and jointly optimise utilisation of the ACT electricity and gas networks. Transmission is 
being dealt with by the high-pressure pipeline transmission industry in collaboration with Future Fuels 
CRC and any impacts on the high-pressure steel in the distribution system in the ACT will be obtained 
through that forum. 
The objective of the Test Facility is to evaluate low and medium pressure distribution and customer 
connection systems with up to 100% fraction of hydrogen, including: 
• Materials, pipes and fittings and in particular those in use in the ACT network 
• Work practices including: 
o Installation & commissioning 
o “Hot work” particular new connections 
o Pressure testing and leak detection 
o Emergency response and isolation practices 
• Stakeholder engagement  
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2.  The Test Facility 
 
Prior to commencement of construction a risk assessment was carried out on the conceptual design to 
ensure all parties involved in construction and operation of the facility understood the risks involved 
and some aspects of the conceptual design were modified to reduce any risks to as low as practicable. 
The majority of the site was installed and constructed in 3 months and testing began in late December 
2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Hydrogen Testing Facility 
  
2.1 Design of the Test Facility   
 
The conceptual design of the Test Facility is shown in Figures 2. Given the non-standard nature of the 
project and the short construction time frame involved, it was decided to use the conceptual design to 
“field fit” components into the test layout. This replicates what happens with the medium-pressure 
network installation in the field. 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual diagram of the Test Facility comprising: Production, Distribution and End Use  
As shown in Fig.2 the Test Facility is designed to replicate major components of hydrogen 
distribution network, including: Production, Distribution and End Use. 
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2.2 Production 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Hydrogen Production areas 
 
The hydrogen production area (see Fig.3) includes a 1.2 kW alkaline electrolyser in an 8ft shipping 
container modified to include venting and provide a platform for a 1.2kW solar array. The electrolyser 
produces up to 250 litres of pure hydrogen per hour using 1.2kW of power. The electrolyser will produce 
hydrogen at pressures up to 35 bar and cycles storage between 30 bar and 35 bar. The electrolyser is 
powered by a 5.3 kW solar array split into two separate arrays. The first with 4 panels provide 1.2kW 
and the second with 14 panels that provide the 4.1 kW balance so that generation during low solar 
activity particularly in winter is possible. The arrays are selectable.  
Storage is provided by two “G” size hydrogen bottles (50 litres, 13MPa), with regulators and valves to 
enable operation and testing of the network at distribution pressures with the green hydrogen stored 
from the electrolyser. Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) bottles, regulator and valves are also included to 
enable mixing of hydrogen with natural gas. The size of storage and production is sufficient to 
individually and continuously supply a cooktop for approx. 3 hours, a portable heater for 5 hours and an 
instantaneous hot water system for approx. 15 minutes.  
The electrolyser is currently being used to produce H2 to fill and pressurise the test network and various 
network components under test. In addition, a nitrogen “G” size bottle (50 litres 16MPa) is included to 
allow for purging and safe pressure testing of the system.   A Programmable Logic Controller manages 
renewable power supply from solar PV panels and on-site storage of renewable hydrogen to address 
testing requirements. 
 
2.3 Distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Hydrogen Distribution area 
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A mini network (See Fig.4) has been constructed in a sand bed using polyethylene and nylon pipe and 
components. There are two “runs” 1 comprising nylon pipe and fittings and the other containing 
polyethylene pipe and fittings. The two runs are connected by a copper pipe riser to the supply pressure 
control equipment to a customer meter at the end of the test bed. The type of fittings under test include, 
valves, saddles, "T"s, and domestic regulators and meters. This mini network is designed to simulate all 
the major components in the current network in the ACT. Testing is performed with both new and aged 
equipment and pipes removed from the existing network. 
 
2.4 Consumer End Use 
 
 
Figure 5 Consumer End Use and Appliances testing area 
 
A 20-foot shipping container has been adapted to house the office for the site and includes an area where 
appliances can be connected to the outlet of the test bed network via a standard customer gas installation 
(See Fig.5).This allows appliances such as cooktops to be tested on hydrogen/ natural gas mixes of 5% 
to 100%. A hydrogen BBQ has been obtained to enable testing of the flow characteristic of the network 
on 100% hydrogen. Shipping containers were used to make the facility portable when testing lifecycle 
is complete. 
 
3. Analysis of Safety Management System components 
 
The gas safety management system for distribution networks is required under AS4645:2018.  
Evoenergy natural gas safety systems has been evaluated and the following issues were identified as 
important for continued safety and reliable operation of the network with hydrogen; 
• Design of network and network components 
• Materials 
• Work practices 
• Emergency response 
• Issue related to key stakeholders and the public 
3.1 Design and Components 
 
The design of gas distribution network infrastructure is central to the safety and reliability of gas 
distribution. The Australian Standard AS4645:2018 is the primary document that establishes the 
requirements for gas distribution network design. The Evoenergy hydrogen Test Facility utilises the 
requirements established in AS4645:2018 for the design of the network components into a replica test 
network. 
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3.2 Materials 
 
Materials utilised in the current distribution network in the ACT are reasonably modern as the network 
commenced construction in the early 1980s.The materials and components are common to many 
networks in Australia and around the world. Materials used in the Evoenergy hydrogen Test Facility are 
a mixture of material types such as polyethylene, nylon and copper and as many different jointing 
components for valves and meters as are common in the network today. Aged components removed 
from service are also placed under test. 
Testing of long term effect of hydrogen on polyethylene has been conducted  elsewhere [13] and 
therefore the work carried out by Evoenergy will focus on those aspects not currently being tested 
elsewhere such as testing of nylon and glued joints and installation practices of pipe, fittings and 
components used in both polyethylene and nylon and copper infrastructure. 
 
3.3 Work Practices 
 
A major area related to the safety and reliability of the network are the work practices in ensuring that 
the design and material properties are achieved. Many investigations into the use of hydrogen have 
focussed on materials and properties of hydrogen, However if there are substandard work practices the 
design and asset life and consequently business case will never be achieved. The review of work 
practices is a significant part of the investigation being performed at the Evoenergy hydrogen Test 
Facility. 
For example, all network infrastructure installed at the facility has been by personnel that install the 
network components within the Evoenergy gas network, using the same procedures, tools and 
equipment, jointing compounds and leak detection procedures that are in use on the network today, the 
only additional piece of equipment provided is a dedicated portable hydrogen detector. As we are 
working in conjunction with Canberra Institute of Technology (CIT), gas fitters from CIT installed the 
customer piping and appliances downstream of the network meter as would be the case in a standard 
domestic installation. 
This approach tests not only current work practices and quality but provides a basis for discussion with 
the next generation of gas fitters on the properties of hydrogen vs natural gas. 
 
3.4 Emergency Response 
 
Provision has been made in the test bed to carry out underground leak detection and location, customer 
hot tapping connections and squeezing off for emergency response work. The response to incidents in 
locating leaks, making safe in the event of a rupture or fire are aspects of the safety management system 
that Evoenergy considers essential to ensure that not only is the public and community safe, but that the 
technicians and gas fitters have the tools, techniques, skills and knowledge to manage hydrogen 
distribution as safely and reliably as with the current gas network. Evoenergy intends to invite 
emergency services to the site and demonstrate how a response to a hydrogen incident would be 
managed. 
 
3.5 Stakeholder Communication and Education 
 
The review of work practices provides a suitable forum for stakeholder engagement opportunities and 
many public and industry personnel such as gas fitter students have visited the site whilst in operation.  
 
4. Testing and evaluation 
 
Since there are many areas to be evaluated for a move to distribute and use 100% hydrogen and the level 
of activity in Australia and around the world has increased over the past 12 months, Evoenergy have put 
in place a number of mechanisms to ensure the bench testing project remains relevant and does not 
duplicate testing and evaluation happening elsewhere. The project has been designed as an agile project 
to able to jump or skip stages if the information becomes available from other sources. 
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These initiatives include regular reporting on the project to the peak gas industry body Energy Networks 
Australia (ENA) and its Gas Committee, which has representation from all gas distributors in Australia 
and operates in a close association with corresponding industry bodies in UK and Europe. 
Australian National University (ANU) has also provided access to its laboratory testing capabilities 
where specific issues are to be addressed. ANU undergraduate and master's students carry out specific 
research projects extending the scope of the Test Facility, and utilising the Test Facility results as a 
corroboration of findings. 
Future research efforts are expected to include: 
• Modelling hydrogen behaviour in the network in the presence of impurities 
• Novel storage and generation approaches 
• Hydrogen sensors for spatial leak detection and information management 
• Odourisation and leak detection 
• Options for flame visibility 
• Regulatory and legal framework and societal impacts 
4.1 Testing strategy 
 
The testing strategy was developed to address the most prevalent distribution issues potentially arising 
from replacing natural gas with hydrogen in the most common network infrastructure currently in the 
ACT network. The initial stages of the testing strategy will deal with lower volume items and any 
specialist equipment. Given the volume of components to be tested, it was decided to deal with domestic 
installations before addressing commercial installations as the fundamentals of distribution of hydrogen 
to the public in an intrinsically safe way is the same for distribution to commercial premises. 
The initial stages are: 
1. Pressure testing under nitrogen and under 100% hydrogen.  
2. Evaluation of hydrogen production using a solar PV powered electrolyser and of on-site 
storage of renewable hydrogen. 
3. Trials of mixing natural gas with hydrogen and evaluation of  home appliances operations 
when proportion of H2/natural gas varies. 
The first stage of testing commenced in early 2019 which is simply a pressure hold test on 100% 
hydrogen for all the network components at the Testing Facility. This includes the development of 
procedure for the use of hydrogen sensors and leak test solution as any leaks are identified and located. 
Test pressures are set at operating pressures and the pressure and temperature monitored and recorded 
over a period of weeks. The volume in the test bed equals approximately 30 litres, with more than 80 
fittings and 160 joints (See conceptual schematic Fig.1). This small volume makes the test setup very 
sensitive to temperature changes and leaks at very small leak rates which are easily detected via pressure 
decay. 
To reduce the temperature effect and insulate the pipework and fittings they are buried in sand at a depth 
of at least 300mm. This also simulates the environment of the network for underground leak detection 
and location. Once the network pipework has been pressure tested on hydrogen the next hydrogen 
pressure hold test was to the network meters and regulators and the customer pipework and components 
downstream of the meter. 
Although the Evoenergy’s distributor responsibility ends at the downstream connection of the customer 
meter, the integrity of the customer piping is a significant part of safe delivery and use gas and 
Evoenergy has a responsibility not to distribute gas to a non-compliant customer installation. Therefore 
Evoenergy is working in collaboration with CIT who trains the gas fitters that install the customer 
installations in the ACT and is also testing a customer piping test setup and will test various pipe types 
of pipe including copper and composite pipe and other customer piping components. 
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4.2 Test results to date 
 
Two tests were performed during the 3-month period 17th December to 21st March. A pressure test of 
100% hydrogen on the test network and the ability and sensitivity of locating leaks with the natural gas 
“soapy solution” and a dedicated hydrogen detector. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Leak location with “Soapy Solution” 
 
The pressure test commenced with an integrity pressure test of the network at 110% on nitrogen and 
the introduction of hydrogen up to a maximum pressure of 175kPa. Readings were taken of pressure 
and temperature and indications after a week were that the pressure was reducing at around 5 kPa per 
day. A detector was used to test all exposed pipe joints and a leak was detected at 72 ppm at a steel 
taped fitting on the riser to the gas meter. The leak was also located with “soapy solution” (Figure 6) 
and repaired and pressure re-established to 175 kPa and test resumed. A number of connections were 
made to the end points of the test network to test valves and connect the hydrogen BBQ for 
demonstration purposes. Each time small quantities of hydrogen were released and the network 
repressurised to the test pressure 175kPa. Further reductions in pressure were noted after these 
connections and disconnections although at levels below 1 kPa per day and less than 0.5 % of test 
pressure. These have been located at the gas tape where the joint was disturbed. 
Testing to date has confirmed that polyethylene and nylon pipe and their respective jointing techniques 
can contain 100% hydrogen at pressures used for natural gas. Testing has also confirmed that current 
installation work practices on polyethylene and nylon pipe and joints are suitable for hydrogen service. 
However, the sample of personnel used for installation was limited to two personnel and more testing 
would need to be carried out on the sensitivity to different personnel and weather conditions. 
Evoenergy intend to carry out more of this testing. In the last few weeks Evoenergy has tested gas 
isolation by clamping the nylon pipe under pressure and effecting a repair on the hydrogen network. 
This has proved that this natural gas isolation technique works with 100% hydrogen at natural gas 
pressures. This is an essential technique for live work repairs and emergency response make safe 
applications. 
 
  
Soapy solution 
bubbles indicating a 
leak or weep of a 
fitting 
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4.3  Further testing stages and considerations 
 
In parallel with the hydrogen pressure test Evoenergy has established hydrogen production by 
electrolyser and has commenced testing storage of renewable energy from surplus solar electricity 
utilising the small test gas network as a buffer to shift the supply demand peaks. The Safety Management 
System dictates the need for solutions for odourless supply and colourless combustion of hydrogen 
natural gas is typically odourised by adding tetrahydrothiophene and/or mercaptans or sulphur- free 
odourising agents. This provides a warning smell intended to indicate to people when gas appliances are 
leaking, or gas is otherwise escaping unburnt.  
The legal requirement for odourisation of reticulated natural gas is universal in Australia. For example, 
in Victoria, the Gas Safety (Safety Case) Regulations 2018 (Vic) (ss.46) (made under the Gas Safety 
Act 1997 (Vic) [14]) require that gas must: (a) have an odour which is distinctive and unpleasant; and 
have an odour level that is discernible at one-fifth of the lower explosive limit of the gas. Since hydrogen 
is odourless (just like natural gas), it must be odourised for safety reasons and to comply with the 
regulations. An additional safety issue is that hydrogen flame is invisible. Solutions for the problem of 
odourless supply and colourless combustion of hydrogen must be developed and reflected in relevant 
standards and regulations.  
The two main categories of options are adding specific substances to hydrogen distribution lines 
(chemical solutions) or deploying hydrogen sensor alarms and flame indicators (physical solutions). 
Chemical solutions are potentially complicated by three factors: (i) fuel cells (e.g. in FC vehicles) can 
be damaged by substances added to hydrogen; (ii) a separation of hydrogen and added substances is 
possible when substances are injected far upstream from the point of consumption (e.g. household 
cooktop) and (iii) the regulatory requirements (i.e. gas quality guidelines and standards) restricting the 
addition of substances to the gas supply network.  One chemical solution approach is to inject required 
substances close to the point of consumption e.g. in proximity to gas meters of houses. In this way 
factors (i) and (ii) can be eliminated. Otherwise, physical monitoring solutions would require extremely 
high reliability of alarms equipped with hydrogen sensors. Thermal sensors of hydrogen flame can also 
be implemented in appliances to switch on light indicators (e.g. LED) depicting operational burner of 
the appliance.  One approach to be tested is to integrate a hydrogen sensor with a fire alarm.  
  
5.0 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The hydrogen Test Facility is constructed by Evoenergy to conduct detailed evaluation of the 
requirements, issues and risks associated with the transition to hydrogen. The testing strategy is 
underpinned by the Gas Safety Management System, components of which are also being evaluated to 
understand both technical and regulatory changes that may be required to enable decarbonisation of gas 
distribution network in the Australian Capital Territory and Australia-wide.  
Testing to date on 100% hydrogen has confirmed a number of aspects related to the introduction of 
100% hydrogen into the ACT natural gas network. 
1. Nylon pipe and jointing techniques (glued joints) do not indicate any tendency to leak after 6 
months of exposure to 100% hydrogen at natural gas pressure. 
2. Work practices to install and make safe during an emergency work using the same equipment 
and techniques as for natural gas. 
3. Worker and public confidence is enhanced by demonstrating actual real world situations in 
managing hydrogen. 
These three findings are critical to maintaining a safe and reliable gas network under the existing safety 
case. To ensure alignment with hydrogen existing Regulation and Standards called up as requirements 
under the Safety Case regime need to be updated as appropriate in an informed and coordinated manner.  
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